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We develop a model of two-stage cumulative research and development (R&D), in which
one Research Unit (RU) with an innovative idea bargains to license her nonveriﬁable in-
terim knowledge exclusively to one of two competing Development Units (DUs) via one of
two alternative modes: an Open sale after patenting this knowledge, or a Closed sale in
which precluding further disclosure to a competing DU requires the RU to hold a stake
in the licensed DU’s post-invention revenues. Both modes lead to partial leakage of RU’s
knowledge from its description, to the licensed DU alone in a closed sale, and to both DUs
in an open sale. The open sale is socially optimal; yet the contracting parties choose the
closed sale whenever the interim knowledge is more valuable and leakage is suﬃciently high.
If the extent of leakage is lower, more RUs choose open sales, generating a non-monotonic
relationship between the strength of Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) and aggregate R&D
expenditures and the overall likelihood of development by either DU.
J E LC o d e s :D 2 3 ,O 3 2 ,O 3 4 .1 Introduction
We develop a model of two-stage cumulative research and development (R&D), in which
a Research Unit (RU, e.g., a biotech company) engages in research to produce an interim
innovative idea (“Knowledge”). The idea has no value to consumers but it could be devel-
oped further into a marketable product by one of two competing Development Units (DUs,
e.g., large pharmaceutical companies). The latter are assumed to be far more eﬃcient in
developing the idea than the original research unit itself, by virtue of having deep pockets
which would allow them to avoid the incentive losses arising from external ﬁnancing of
development costs, and/or via owning speciﬁc complementary assets or skills. We study
the key trade-oﬀs between diﬀerent mechanisms for selling or licensing such ideas, involving
patenting of the knowledge or relying on trade secrets. We then characterize when each of
these licensing mechanisms is more likely to be chosen, and derive the implications of these
choices for the structure of licensing fees. In particular, we focus on contractual choices
over (combinations of) lump-sum vs. revenue-contingent royalties, taking into account
their impact on development incentives, and the viability of exclusive licensing of interim
innovative knowledge.
These issues are certainly important in a modern economy. As Scotchmer (1991) notes,
“Most innovators stand on the shoulders of giants, and never more so than in the current
evolution of high technologies, where almost all technical progress builds on a foundation
provided by earlier innovators.” In 2003, in-licensed products accounted for more than $70
billion in revenues for the top 20 pharmaceutical companies (Wood Mackenzie, 2004); on
average, this corresponds to a quarter of their total revenue now and is expected to in-
crease to 40 per cent in a few years. The leading pharmaceutical companies have large
R&D budgets (about 15-20% of sales revenues), and yet rely increasingly on outside re-
search. For example, since 2000 GlaxoSmithKline (GSK) has pursued a new approach to
R & D ,a n dm o v e df r o m2 - 3i n - l i c e n s i n gd e a l say e a rt om o r et h a n1 0e v e r yy e a r( M o r a i s ,
2003). Their restructuring paid oﬀ and other ﬁrms followed GSK, engaging in late- and
early-stage licensing deals (Featherstone and Renfrey, 2004).
In other industries, such sequential innovation is also important, though the nature
of licensing arrangements varies greatly; outside of a small set of industries (including
biotechs) the sellers of knowledge rely on secrecy rather than on patents (Cohen et al.,
2000). Also, inventors are paid in cash, in stock, through participation in joint ventures,
or via revenue-contingent royalties. For example, while purchasing software technology for
its Internet Explorer web browser from Spyglass, Microsoft agreed to pay Spyglass about
$1 per each copy of Internet Explorer distributed (Bank, 1997). Even without wide use of
patents, software ﬁrms manage to generate substantial revenue from licensing; the market
1for intellectual property licensing by software ﬁrms is estimated at $100 billion a year
(Srikanth, 2003).
Several issues concerning the licensing of such intellectual property are of substantial
interest. Why do both in-house and in-licensed research co-exist? Why are some sales
of ideas based on patents and others on trade secrets? What are the roles of lump-sum
fees versus contingent royalty payments in providing incentives for R&D, and for exclusive
licensing?
We attempt to answer some of these questions within an incomplete contract setup
where two potential buyers of non-veriﬁable knowledge compete to obtain a license to
develop the knowledge. Unlike in conventional incomplete contract models, we take into
a c c o u n tn o to n l yt h ef a c tt h a tt h ev a l u eo fs u c hk n o w l e d g ei sn o tv e r i ﬁable, but also
imperfect excludability and non-rivalrous nature of knowledge. Imperfect excludability
implies that after an item of knowledge is described to a potential buyer, he immediately
captures a certain share of its potential value. Indeed, utilization of at least part of the
idea is a credible threat which may weaken the seller’s bargaining position. On the other
hand, the non-rivalrous nature of knowledge makes it diﬃcult for the seller to commit to an
exclusive sale: after selling knowledge to one buyer, the seller can sell it again to another
buyer. We explore the implications of alternative licensing mechanisms that enable the
seller to commit to exclusivity.
A conventional approach to assuring exclusivity is via patenting. Teece (2000, page 22)
writes: “Patents are in one sense the strongest form of intellectual property because they
grant the ability to exclude, whereas copyrights and trade secrets do not prevent ﬁrms
that make independent but duplicative discoveries from practicing their innovations and
inventions”. As Teece (2000) notes elsewhere, the “doctrine of equivalents” (of insubstantial
diﬀerences), or of a similar “look and feel”, are often applied much less stringently in trade
secret or trademark litigation than in those over patented inventions. As a result, the
licensor of patented interim knowledge ﬁn d si tm u c he a s i e rt op r e - c o m m i tt oe x c l u s i v e
licensing thereof. If she were to sell her knowledge to another developer, his ﬁnal invention
would embody the same look-and-feel as the aspects of the knowledge codiﬁed in the patent,
and it would be thus denied a ﬁnal invention patent. Of course, in reality such enforcement
of patents is only probabilistic, as in Anton and Yao (2004), but for simplicity we will
assume that patenting is a perfect means for exclusion.
However, patenting also involves a leakage of a certain portion of the knowledge to
the public in the process of ﬁling a patent application. This is especially important for
most “tacit” (Teece, 2000) or non-codiﬁable knowledge. Such knowledge is hard to protect
using intellectual property rights (IPR) law, since description of the codiﬁable features of
an innovation in a patent nevertheless leaves open many possibilities for inventing around
2the patent, and creating a ﬁnal product without the same extent of similar look and feel
a so n et h a te m p l o y e dt h ec o d i ﬁable aspects of an idea, such as its molecular structure. For
example, many innovations in software create possibilities for inventing around, using de-
tailed source codes that diﬀer from those in the original invention, but nevertheless utilizing
structural notions implicit in the patented idea. Description of an innovation in a patent
can then lead to a partial spillover of capabilities for second-stage invention, to parties
other than the original innovator, or its licensee for the patented idea. As Cohen et al.
(2000) have noted on the basis of survey data, in most US industries “patents are consid-
ered less eﬀective relative to alternative mechanisms for protecting intellectual assets, such
as secrecy and lead times”, because of knowledge spillovers arising from the descriptions
involved in the patenting process. As a result, in both US and EU (see Arundel and Kable,
1998 for the latter), a minority of innovations are patented, typically in industries having
highly codiﬁable inventions.
The alternative arrangement is to sell the knowledge privately, relying on trade secrets.
Trade secrets do not involve putting the description of the invention in the public domain
and therefore avoid the abovementioned knowledge spillovers. However, without patents
it is hard for the seller to commit to an exclusive sale. Upon selling the innovation, the
seller has incentives to resell the knowledge to a competing buyer. The existing literature
on collaborative research (e.g. Teece, 2000, Pisano, 1989, ch. 3, Oxley, 1999, Majewski,
2004) recognizes the risk of such opportunistic disclosure as an important factor shaping
the contractual environment and organizational structure.1 Indeed, it is hard to punish
the seller of the knowledge for the second sale. Courts may refuse to enforce contracts
that stipulate a penalty for the knowledge seller in case of invention by a developer other
than her licensee, as long as they believe that this developer might have originated similar
knowledge on his own. As Denicolo and Franzoni (2004a, p. 367) note: “Trade secret law
does not protect the inventor from independent rediscovery” and that is exactly what this
developer, who in fact beneﬁtted from a second sale of knowledge by the RU, would claim.
We consider a more realistic mechanism for committing to exclusive sale without patents.
The original buyer gives the researcher a share of its future revenues (through an equity
stake or through royalties).2 If this revenue share is suﬃciently high, the seller would prefer
not to sell the knowledge to the ﬁrst buyer’s competitors, because the value of the RU’s
royalty stake is contingent on the ﬁrst buyer achieving a monopoly position in the product
market. While others such as Pisano (1989) have also suggested a linkage between the
co-ownership of equity shares and preventing harmful opportunistic knowledge disclosure,
we are the ﬁrst to fully analyze this mechanism taking into account its eﬀects on both
buyers’ and sellers’ incentives.3
Even though this share-based mechanism (which we call the “closed” mode of licensing)
3assures exclusive licensing, it does not come free of charge. The buyer’s incentive to invest
in development is more severely undermined the higher the share of his ﬁnal revenues
he has to give away to the knowledge seller.We show that this mechanism works better
when the original idea is highly valuable. The more valuable the knowledge, the higher
is the probability of ﬁnal invention by an exclusive licensee. Hence, a clandestine sale
of knowledge to a second developer greatly diminishes the value of the knowledge seller’s
expected revenue share in the original licensee, by sharply lowering his propspects for sole
invention. As a result, for a higher level of knowledge the seller is induced to abide by
an exclusive license for a smaller share in the licensee’s future revenues. The buyer keeps
a higher share of his future revenue, which results in more eﬃcient investment in further
development. Moreover, as we formally show, for the least valuable ideas this revenue share
mechanism ceases to function. If the seller’s revenue share is low, the seller has an incentive
to resell the knowledge to the competing buyer; if it is high, the buyer does not invest much
in development of the idea. The value of the exclusive licensee is low, and the seller has no
incentive to abide by exclusivity.
We explicitly model the extensive form bargaining between the parties in the patent-
based and trade-secret-based modes of licensing, and ﬁnd that the parties are more likely
to choose the non-patented (or “closed”) mode of licensing over patenting if the interim
knowledge is highly valuable, and if describing the knowledge involves substantial leakage.
The intuition for the latter eﬀect is straightforward. On one hand, greater leakage in the
patenting process makes patenting a less attractive option. On the other hand, in closed
sales, greater leakage via private description of knowledge is helpful, as then the seller would
have a weaker bargaining position in a clandestine opportunistic sale to the competitor of
the original buyer. As a result, a lower revenue share from the original licensee would suﬃce
to dissuade her.
The explanation for more valuable knowledge being licensed privately follows from the
detailed comparison of incentives in a revenue-contingent royalty contract, with those aris-
ing via patenting before licensing. This comparison takes into account two major eﬀects.
The ﬁrst one is that the share of future revenue that RU has to be given to assure no second
sale is decreasing in the level of knowledge. Thus, RU and her licensee DU capture a higher
(but diminishing in slope) proportion of the full potential value of interim knowledge as its
level increases.
The second eﬀect has to do with the impact of higher levels of knowledge on the non-
licensee DUs’ eﬀort when patenting knowledge leads to non-trivial enabling spillover of it
to him. This eﬀect is not monotonic in knowledge. We analyze the impact of leakage on
development eﬀorts as Nash equilibrium outcomes in asymmetric contests for rents arising
from ﬁnal inventions. Higher knowledge for the licensee initially increases not only his
4but also the non-licensee’s invention prospects, which later decrease as levels of licensed
knowledge increase further. Thus, the proportion of the potential value of RU’s knowledge
— which would have accrued to her and her licensee DU without spillovers — captured by
her and her licensee in patent-based licensing, is ﬁrst decreasing and then increasing in
RU’s knowledge level. Our result arises from these two key eﬀects, plus the possibility of
non-existence of revenue sharing contracts which would ensure exclusive trade secret-based
licensing for lower levels of knowledge.
Even though the trade-secret-based licensing is chosen for the more valuable and less
codiﬁable ideas, we show that it is socially suboptimal to the patent-based mode. Indeed,
the licensor-licensee coalition neglects the non-licensee’s welfare due to public knowledge
disclosure via patents, and the consumer surplus due to product market competition be-
tween licensee and non-licensee DUs.
The recent paper of Anton and Yao (2004) contains results related to ours on the choice
between patenting or otherwise at diﬀerent levels of know-how, and protection of intellectual
property rights. However, these are derived in a context without cumulative R&D, in which
the purpose of partial know-how disclosure is to signal one’s cost level to product market
competitors, and rewards from patenting consist of expected penalties derived from patent
infringement suits. These ex post infringement penalties are assumed to be independent
of the quality of disclosed knowledge. Anton and Yao (2004) also ﬁnd that higher-valued
innovations (those reducing costs of production the most) would not be patented, but
protected as trade secrets with fairly low levels of disclosure. In contrast, Denicolo and
Franzoni (2004b), who endogenise the levels of imitation eﬀorts by non-innovators whenever
the original invention is not patented, ﬁnd that more valuable inventions with larger markets
are more likely to be patented, with others relying on trade secrets. In our work, we
endogenise knowledge licensing fees via buyer-seller bargaining, and rule out any outside
imitation of interim (and non-marketed) knowledge licensed via trade secrets.
We then consider the implications of our results for the impact of intellectual property
protection — either legally as determined by the stringency and enforcement of patents
(IPR), or as determined by the nature of the technology that is described pre-licensing
— on the overall extent of development expenditures, as well as their productivity, aimed
at ﬁnal invention. We show that the tradeoﬀsw ea n a l y z em a ys u ﬃce to generate non-
monotonic relationships between the strength of intellectual property protection (including
IPR) and aggregate R&D expenditures. In particular, depending on the ex ante distribution
of the interim knowledge levels, an interior degree of such protection may maximize overall
levels and eﬃcacy of development eﬀorts, when endogenous choices over licensing modes
are allowed, but that is not the case when attention is restricted to patented sales.
Earlier theoretical models pertaining to endogenous expenditures on imitation as well
5as innovation, in the context of patented ﬁnal inventions, have suggested the possibility of
a non-monotonic, indeed “inverted U-shaped”, relationship between the strength of IPR
protection as measured by patent length and R&D activity.4 A recent empirical study by
Lerner (2001) provides some support for this conjecture. In our model, such an inverted
U-shaped relationship between the strength of intellectual property protection — measured
as the complement of the extent of knowledge leakage pre-licensing—emerges more simply,
from the impact of such protection on endogenous choices over knowledge licensing modes
at diﬀerent levels of knowledge.
Our analysis develops the application of the incomplete contracting paradigm by Gross-
man and Hart (1986) to the issues of incentive for R&D started by Aghion and Tirole (1994)
who analyzed knowledge licensing fees and their implications for incentives to expend non-
contractible eﬀorts or invest in research and development, by a RU incapable of development
and a single DU incapable of ﬁrst-stage research. We also extend the important work of
Anton and Yao (1994) which considered rent-extraction by an RU from a DU based on a
threat of knowledge disclosure to a competing DU, when leakage of knowledge arising from
its description is complete.5
Our paper is also related to the literature on foreclosure, exclusive dealing, and vertical
integration, surveyed in Rey and Tirole (2005). The latter is also concerned with the prob-
lem of pre- commitment, when a monopolistic upstream supplier can sell an intermediate
input to multiple competing ﬁnal goods producers downstream. The upstream ﬁrm seeks to
extract as much surplus as possible, via strategic pricing of the input. In particular, several
authors (for example, McAfee and Schwartz, 1994), model the possibility of the upstream
ﬁrm making secret input supply oﬀers to a second downstream ﬁrm after reaching an agree-
ment with the ﬁrst ﬁrm, and then elaborate on mechanisms such as vertical integration to
internalize the externalities involved. Our revenue-sharing mechanism for knowledge sales
based on trade secrets shares a similar ﬂavor, as does a mechanism analyzed by Cestone
and White (2003) in which giving equity shares to a monopolistic lender may dissuade
her from ﬁnancing competing entrants. Our main contributions are to consider also the
alternative mechanism of patenting, which too enables commitment to exclusive licensing,
and to characterize how choices across these mechanisms depend on some salient features
of interim knowledge.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we set up our model, describ-
ing its notation, timing and the protocols of bargaining processes involved in knowledge
licensing. In Section 3 we characterize the equilibrium choices over modes of licensing,
and structure of fees, across RU and her licensee DU. In Section 4 we study comparative
statics with respect to the degree of protection of intellectual property, both analytically
and numerically. Section 5 concludes.
62 The model
2.1 The setup
There are three risk neutral agents: a research unit RU and two competing development
units DU1 and DU2. These parties undertake research (by RU) and development (by DUs)
to create a new product. The investments in research and development are sequential.
First, RU produces knowledge K. This knowledge has no value per se, but is an input in
the development stage which may result in the creation of a new product. If only one DU
develops successfully, he obtains a monopoly rent of V =1in the product market. If two
DUs succeed in development, they compete a la Bertrand and both get zero rents. In this
paper, we do not focus on the knowledge generation process and take the level of knowledge
K ∈ [0,1] as given. We assume K to be the outcome of an exogenous random process with
a density known ex ante.
For each DU, his probability P of successful development is a strictly increasing and
concave function of his acquired knowledge and subsequent costly non-contractible devel-
opment eﬀort choice. For analytical tractability, we focus on a functional form that allows
us to characterize the equilibrum choices of Pi by a DUi as linear functions of DUj’s choice
Pj, as well as RU’s ex post revenue share. The intuition behind our results, elaborated in
the Introduction and below, should hold for a wider range of such development probability




The development eﬀort E is measured in terms of its cost. These are assumed to be
non-veriﬁable. Knowledge is metrized in terms of the maximum probability of successful
second-stage invention it could lead to. The constraint E ≤ 1/2 is to make sure that this





, so that this constraint is never binding.
2.2 Timing and assumptions
T h et i m i n go fe v e n t si sp r e s e n t e di nt h eF i g u r e1 .
1. Ex ante.
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The parties choose the mode of licensing of RU’s knowledge, and then bargain on
t h el i c e n s i n gf e ec o n t r a c t . T h eb a r g a i n i n gg a m ei ne a c hm o d e ,w i t ha n dw i t h o u t
patenting, is described in detail below.
The two alternative modes of knowledge licensing evolve as follows.
(a) Open mode.
A patent (IPR) is registered, so that RU can commit to sell her knowledge to
one party only.This requires RU describing her knowledge publicly which leads
to a partial leakage of her knowledge; an exogenous proportion Lo ∈ [0,1] of
the knowledge K is divulged to both DUs. Both DUs also infer the level of RU’s
knowledge K from this description. The ﬁrm i that licenses the full content of
RU’s knowledge pays RU a lump-sum fee Fo and chooses development eﬀort Ei;
the respective probability of development is Pi = p(K,Ei). The other ﬁrm j
chooses eﬀort Ej, and his probability of development is Pj = p(LoK,Ej). These
eﬀort choices {Ei,E j} form Nash equilibrium strategies in the game between the
two DUs with ex post payoﬀs contingent on their ﬁnal inventions as described
below.
(b) Closed mode.
Knowledge disclosure occurs through a private sale to one of the DUs (randomly
chosen by the RU). The parties bargain about a licensing contract, with its
payoﬀsc o n t i n g e n ti np a r to nD U i’s post-invention revenues. As the ex post
outcome is binary (V =1or V =0 ), this contract includes only two variables:
a lump-sum transfer Fc from DUi to RU and RU’s share s (e.g. via royalties) in
DUi’s ex post revenues.
To initiate the bargaining RU provides a description of her knowledge, which
is suﬃcient for DUi to infer its level K. This description also leads to some
8partial leakage of RU’s knowledge, LcK,t oD U i,w h e r eLc ∈ [0,1] is also an
exogenous parameter. After RU and DUi agree on the terms of disclosure, RU
reveals the full content of her knowledge to the licensee DUi,a n dD U i chooses
his development eﬀort Ei.W e d e n o t e Pc as his corresponding probability of
invention.
RU could also sell her knowledge to DUj subsequently. In this opportunistic
deviation by RU, she would ﬁrst describe her knowledge causing leakage LcK to
DUj. If they agree on a fee for RU disclosing the full content of her knowledge,
DUj would then choose the probability of development Pd (where d stands for
‘deviation’) given the DUi’s choice of Pc.I fR Ua n dD U j failed to agree upon the
licensing fee, DUj would develop on the basis of leaked knowledge; in this case
we denote his choice of probability of invention as Qd. By choosing the share
s appropriately, DUi will try to preclude RU’s knowledge disclosure to DUj. If
s is suﬃciently high, RU could be interested in protecting DUi’s ex post rents
from competition; we characterize when this is feasible.
3. Ex post.
Successful developers compete a la Bertrand. If only one DU invents successfully, he
obtains a monopoly rent of V =1 . If both develop successfully then both get zero
V =0 ,w h i c hi sa l s ot h e i rp a y o ﬀ if neither invents.
In our view, it is at least a plausible working hypothesis that proportions of enabling
knowledge leaked to potential licensees in private Lc and patent-based Lo descriptions may
be very similar — especially for an interim innovative idea. For such innovations the ﬁnal
details of its implementation (e.g. the precise product or manufacturing process) remain
unclear. While the description of codiﬁable aspects of an innovation in a patent would
preclude their replication (via resale), pre-licensing description of the idea in a closed-mode
negotiation, to establish its potential, might not need such aspects to be disclosed prior
to reaching agreement on a licensing contract. If that is not the case, then Lc is likely to
exceed Lo.6
2.3 Bargaining in the open mode
The multilateral bargaining game in the open mode is similar to the one in Bolton and
Whinston (1993). RU and the DUs bargain about full disclosure of knowledge K. After
patenting, RU makes an oﬀer to DUi. The oﬀer speciﬁes the payment Fo for the exclusive
disclosure of knowledge K to DUi. DUi either accepts or declines the oﬀer. In the former
case, DUi develops on the basis of K, while the competing DUj only has access to the
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DU2 gets LoK 
RU discloses K to DU2 
DU1 gets LoK 
Figure 2: Bargaining in the open mode.
leaked knowledge LK.I f D U i declines RU’s oﬀer, RU makes an oﬀer to DUj and so on.
We analyze an inﬁnite horizon bargaining game, with parties having a common discount
rate δ → 1.
Once the agreement on the terms of disclosure is reached, DU1,2 choose their post-
licensing levels of development eﬀort E1,2 (equivalently, their probabilities of successful
development P1,2), as detailed above.
We rule out patented sales to both DUs. We shall show that in the resulting tripartite
bargaining (e.g., see Bolton and Whinston, 1993) this is always dominated from RU’s point
of view by an exclusive knowledge sale to one DU. The RU is better-oﬀ with the exclusive
sale, even when licensing to both DUs may increase total developers’ surplus ex interim.
The rationale is that in the latter case RU would only get half of this total surplus, while
under an exclusive sale the two DUs compete a la Bertrand for a single license, modulo the
DUs’ disagreement option of development based on leaked knowledge. A formal proof is
provided in Section 3.
2.4 Bargaining in the closed mode
RU randomly chooses DUi to arrange a private sale. The bargaining in the closed mode is
a conventional bilateral alternating oﬀer game as in Rubinstein (1982): RU makes an oﬀer
of {s,Fc};i fD U i declines, it makes a counteroﬀer etc.
The resulting sharing of payoﬀs must take into account the outside options of both RU
and DUi. RU has the option of patenting her knowledge for open mode licensing. Once
the IPR is registered, in the form of a patent, the two parties cannot return to private
10RU and DU1 
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Figure 3: Bargaining in the closed mode. Arrows indicate the equilibrium path.
sales. RU would therefore not enter into a closed mode sale unless it would generate a total
expected payoﬀ for her (Fc + sPc) that at least equals her equilibrium licensing fee Fo in
the open-mode.
Similar logic applies to DU’s outside option. As we will show below, in equilibrium Fo
is such that both DUs obtain equal net payoﬀ in the open mode licensing. Hence either
of them would reject any closed-mode oﬀer from the RU below what the non-licensee DU
would have in a patented sale based on the enabling knowledge LcK that is disclosed to
DUi in the course of closed-mode negotiations. If Lc equals Lo, either party can force
reversal to the open mode during bargaining. We describe below how these concerns aﬀect
their equilibrium choices over the modes of licensing.
2.5 Interim payoﬀs
We will denote as Tc and To the total equilibrium ex interim expected surplus of RU
cum the licensee DU obtaining the full knowledge in the closed and in the open mode,
respectively. We will denote as Uoi (Pi,P j;K) the expected ex interim payoﬀ of this DU
in the development race in the open mode, whereas the other DUj chooses probability of
invention Pj to maximize Uoj (Pj,P i;LoK). A c c o r d i n gt o( 1 ) ,D U i’s eﬀort cost is Ei =
P2
i /(2K) so that in the open mode
Uoi =[ ( 1− Pj)Pi − P
2
i /(2K) − Fo] (2)
which increases in K and decreases in Pj. Since Fo is paid before the development eﬀort is
chosen, the DUi’s payoﬀ (2) is maximized at Pi = K(1−Pj). The competing DUj develops
11on the basis of leaked knowledge LoK; he maximizes his payoﬀ
Uoj =[ ( 1− Pi)Pj − P
2
j /(2LoK)]
by choosing Pj = LoK(1 − Pi).
Correspondingly, in the closed model of knowledge sale the licensee DU obtains:
Uc =[ ( 1− s)Pi − P
2
i /(2K) − Fc] (3)
where Pc is the optimal choice of Pi in this mode. T h eR U ’ sp a y o ﬀ consists of the royalty
sPc and the cash payment Fc made before the choice of development eﬀort. For simplicity,
we assume that the non-licensee DUj has no development capabilities in equilibrium. The
licensing terms, Fc and s, are chosen via bilateral bargaining between RU and DUi; the
contract terms incentivise RU not to sell her knowledge do DUj.
2.6 Choice over licensing modes
In essence, the bargaining structure above implies that the choice of the mode would be
made according to whether or not the total (subgame- perfect) equilibrium payoﬀss u m m e d
across the RU and her licensee DU, {To,c}, is higher in the open or the closed mode of
licensing, with the following two main exceptions.
If Lc is higher than Lo by a suﬃcient amount, then RU may not make a closed-mode
oﬀer even when Tc >T o. In the closed mode sale the licensee DUi would not pay RU more
than what he would gain from having the whole knowledge K and his rival DUj none, as
compared to DUi having knowledge LcK and DUj having K, as in Anton and Yao (1994).
This payment to RU could be lower than Fo.
The other case is where K is such that the level of RU’s required revenue share s to
ensure an exclusive closed-mode sale is so high that RU has to make a lump-sum payment
to her licensee DUi,F c < 0,t om a k eD U i accept a closed sale over a patented one. As RU’s
wealth constraint precludes her making the payment, the parties may choose to patent the
knowledge even though Tc >T o. This happens whenever Tc − sPc <T o − Fo.W ec o n s i d e r
further implications of this case in a companion paper.
3 Equilibrium outcomes
In this Section we characterize the equilibrium payoﬀs of the RU and the DUs under the
alternative modes of disclosure at the ex interim stage. First, we derive the joint surplus
of the RU and her licensee DUi in the open and closed modes of disclosure, To(K,Lo)
and Tc(K,Lc), respectively. Then we study the choice of licensing mode and describe the
division of the surplus between RU and DUi. All proofs are contained in the Appendix.
123.1 Open mode
If a patent is registered then the exclusive licensee DUi pays RU a licensing fee Fo and
obtains knowledge K. A tt h es a m et i m e ,k n o w l e d g eLoK is leaked to the public domain,
so the competing DUj can also engage in the development contest. The joint surplus of
RU and DUi will therefore equal To =[ Uoi + Fo]; see (2). The competing DUj will use
the leaked knowledge LoK, and will therefore receive [(1 − Po)Qo − Q2
o/(2LoK)]. Here the
probabilities {Po,Q o} satisfy the Nash equilibrium conditions:
Po =a r gm a x
p
£
(1 − Qo)p − p
2/(2K)
¤
= K(1 − Qo),
Qo =a r gm a x
p
£
(1 − Po)p − p
2/(2LoK)
¤
= LoK(1 − Po).
For each pair of K and Lo t h es o l u t i o ni su n i q u e :
Po =
K(1 − LoK)
1 − LoK2 ; Qo =
LoK(1 − K)
1 − LoK2 . (4)
Note that Po is increasing in K for all Lo, while Qo is initially increasing and then decreasing
in K, approaching the limit of Qo =0as K → 1 for all Lo < 1. Indeed, knowledge has
two eﬀects on incentives to exert eﬀort. There is a positive direct eﬀect, and there is a
negative indirect eﬀect that works via strategic response to the competing DU. The direct
eﬀect is stronger for the licensee DU as it uses full rather than leaked knowledge. However,
the magnitude of the indirect eﬀect is stronger for the non-licensee DUj f o rh i g h e rl e v e l so f
knowledge K.
The RU’s fee F0 is determined as the outcome of the sequential oﬀer bargaining game
described in the Section 2.3 above, emulating Bolton and Whinston (1993).
Lemma 1 In the open mode the licensing fee sets the licenses DUi to his disagreement pay-
oﬀ: either DU obtains the net payoﬀ of Uo
∆ = Uoj (Qo,P o;LoK)=[ ( 1− Po)Qo − Qo/(2LoK)],
while RU obtains Fo =[ {Po(1 − Qo) − P2
o/(2K)} − {(1 − Po)Qo − Q2
o/(2LoK)}] from DUi.
Essentially, this bargaining results in Bertrand competition between the two DUs: RU
extracts all the additional surplus of the licensee DU, making his participation constraint
b i n d .T h ei n t u i t i o nf o rt h i sr e s u l ti sr e l a t e dt ot h en a t u r eo fp a t e n t e dI P R :R Uh o l d sf u l l
rights for an exclusive sale, and can choose whom to sell her knowledge to.











Both To(K,Lo) and Fo(K,Lo) increase in K and decrease in Lo for all K,Lo ∈ [0,1]. On
the other hand, either DU’s payoﬀ Uo increases with Lo. Indeed, the licensee DU receives
13her reservation utility which is equal to the payoﬀ of a non-licensed DU; the latter clearly
increases when the proportion of knowledge that is leaked increases. However, unlike To
and Fo,e a c hD U ’ sp a y o ﬀ Uo is ﬁrst increasing and then decreasing in K, approaching zero
as K −→ 1 for all Lo < 1. This is an implication of the non-monotonic relationship between
K and the non-licensee’s eﬀort Qo discussed above.
Remark 1 RU is better oﬀ with an exclusive sale rather than selling knowledge twice.
Indeed, suppose that RU decides to sell knowledge to both DUs. In equilibrium each DU
develops with probability Po = K/(1 + K); gross of the licensing fee, each DU’s surplus is
K
2(1+K)2; the solution is equivalent to (4) and (5) in the limiting case Lo =1 . Following the
proof in Bolton and Whinston (1993) for the case of sales to both downstream ﬁrms, we




2(1+K)2 − Uoj (Qo,P o;LoK)
´
. Overall, RU collects
µ
K
















1 − LoK2 = Fo.
Therefore, even though the total DUs’ surplus is larger, RU can only capture a small part
of this surplus and is therefore not willing to sell to both DUs.
3.2 Closed mode
If the contracting parties do not register a patent but choose disclosure via a closed sale,
there is no leakage to outsiders in equilibrium. However, in order to provide RU with
incentives not to disseminate knowledge to the competing DUj,D U i has to give away a
suﬃcient share s of his ex post revenues in royalties to RU. The formal condition is that
the reduction in the RU’s royalties due to opportunistic disclosure to DUj must weakly
exceed the maximum fee that RU may get from DUj:
[sPc − sPc(1 − Pd)] ≥
£©











where Pc is chosen by the licensee DUi and {Pd,Q d} are the potential choices of the other
DUj if the RU attempts to sell knowledge to her. Pd would be chosen by DUj if she had
full knowledge, and Qd would be her choice with leaked knowledge LcK.
For a given share s, the left-hand side in (6) is the reduction in the RU’s payoﬀ due to
opportunistic disclosure to DUj. The right hand side is the maximum licensing fee that RU
may extract from DUj in case she decides to disclose to him after licensing her knowledge
to DUi. The logic of calculating this licensing fee is very similar to the one in open sales:
since the process of negotiating the fee results in a partial leakage of knowledge LcK,R U
c a no b t a i nf r o mD U j at most the expression in the right-hand side. If and only if (6) is
14violated, there exists a fee that DUj will be willing to pay and RU will be willing to accept
in exchange for the clandestine second sale. RU’s incentives for exclusive disclosure come
f r o mt h ef a c tt h a ts e l l i n gt h ek n o w l e d g et oac o m p e t i n gD U j dilutes the DUi’s expected
payoﬀ, and thus reduces the value of RU’s royalty stake from sPc to sPc(1−Pd) as described
in the left-hand side of (6).
While giving a suﬃciently high share of ex post revenues to RU rules out opportunistic
disclosure, it comes at a cost of lowering the licensed DU’s incentives to apply eﬀort. Indeed,
by solving for optimal eﬀort of DUj and DUi we ﬁnd that Pc decreases in s :
Pd =a r gm a x
p
£
(1 − Pc)p − p
2/(2K)
¤
= K(1 − Pc); (7)
Qd =a r gm a x
q
£
(1 − Pc)q − q
2/(2LcK)
¤
= LcK(1 − Pc); (8)
Pc =a r gm a x
p
£
(1 − s)p − p
2/(2K)
¤
= K(1 − s). (9)
In equilibrium, RU and DUi will choose the minimum possible s ∈ [0,1] that satisﬁes
(6). Cancelling the sPc terms in the left hand side of (6) and using (7) and (8), we rewrite








By substituting (7) and (9) into (10), we obtain a quadratic inequality
sK(1 − s) ≥ (1 − K(1 − s))(1 − Lc)/2. (11)
Lemma 2 A mechanism for a closed knowledge sale, which is incentive-compatible for no
f u r t h e rd i s c l o s u r eb yt h eR U ,r e q u i r e sR Ut ob eg i v e nas h a r es = s∗(K;Lc) in her licensee






(1 + Lc)2 − 8(1 − Lc)(1/K − 1)
´
/4 < 1/2. (12)
The licensee DU develops with probability Pi = Pc = K(1 − s∗(K;Lc)), the other DU does
not develop.
T h i sc l o s e dm o d el i c e n s i n gi so n l yf e a s i b l ei fs u c hs∗(K;Lc) exists, i.e., whenever K ≥








This result is intuitive; the monopoly rents of DUi suﬃce to overcome RU’s temptation
to disclose to the other DU whenever the level of interim knowledge is high enough. If
K<b K(Lc) then the private disclosure to one DU cannot be arranged because of the
15adverse incentive eﬀect on DU’s eﬀort. In order to increase the RU’s stake, DUi gives RU
ah i g h e rs h a r es.H o w e v e r ,a ss increases, DUi’s eﬀort decreases, so that Pc falls. Hence,
the competing DUj is prepared to pay more for the knowledge: the lower Pc, the higher
the payoﬀ to DUj’s eﬀort. At lower levels of interim knowledge K<b K(Lc),R U ’ sr e t u r n s
t oo p p o r t u n i s t i cd i s c l o s u r e( t h er i g h t - h a n ds i d ei n( 6 ) )i n c r e a s ei ns so rapidly that the
beneﬁts of keeping DUi a monopoly (the left-hand side in (6)) never catch up with it.
Since Pc = K(1 − s),s P c reaches its maximum at s =1 /2, implying s∗(K;Lc) ≤ 1/2.The
closed mode is feasible over a larger range of K when leakage Lc is high,s i n c eR U ’ sp a y o ﬀ
from a deviant second sale declines when Lc increases. Indeed, b K(Lc) decreases in Lc from
b K(0) = 8/9 to b K(1) = 0.
Whenever the closed mode is incentive-compatible, the RU’s share s∗(K;Lc) decreases
with K and with Ls. The higher K, the higher the payoﬀ to the monopoly development.
Since higher K increases the probability of successful development, if there were two com-
p e t i n gd e v e l o p e r st h e r ew o u l db eah i g hc o s to fe xp o s tr e n td i s s i p a t i o nd u et oB e r t r a n d
competition. Therefore RU has incentives not to disclose to the second DU even if her share
s is small. Furthermore, the value of RU’s stake in post-invention revenues sPc decreases
in K.7 Clearly, whenever s = s∗(K;Lc) exists, it decreases in K, and so that right-hand
side of (11) decreases in K. Therefore the left-hand side sK(1 −s)=sPc also decreases in
K. T h ej o i n ts u r p l u so fR Ua n dD U i








is increasing in K. This joint surplus is concave in K and approaches K/2 as K increases;
although s∗(K;Lc) decreases in K, its rate of decrease slows down at higher levels of K.
Indeed, s∗(K,Lc) is convex in K as s∗(K,Lc) is a negative linear function of a square root
of concave function of K.
Unlike in the open mode where the joint surplus of RU and the licensed DUi decreases in
leakage Lo,j o i n ts u r p l u sTc in the closed mode increases with Lc.I fLc is higher, RU would
receive less from the competing DUj; the opportunistic disclosure option is less attractive.
Hence, DUi can give RU a lower share of ex post revenues; his development eﬀort and
probability of successful development Pc rise. This also leads to a higher joint surplus
Tc(K,Lc) when Lc rises, since the share s∗(K;Lc) falls (see equation (14)).
3.3 The choice of the mode of disclosure
I nt h i sS e c t i o nw es h o wt h a tt h ep a r t i e sc h o o s et h ec l o s e dm o d eo v e rt h eo p e nm o d ei fLo,L c,
or K are suﬃciently high. If the leakages Lo,L c are low, the open mode dominates the
















Tc/(K/2), Lc=0 To/(K/2), Lo=0
Tc/(K/2), Lc=0.1 To/(K/2), Lo=0.1
Tc/(K/2), Lc=0.4 To/(K/2), Lo=0.4
Figure 4: The graph presents joint surplus as a share of K/2 (i.e. surplus if there were no
leakage in the open or no threat of second sale in teh closed mode). In the closed mode,
Tc/(K/2) is concave in K, while in the open mode To/(K/2) is convex in K.
competing DUj; ex interim joint surplus To is close to its maximum maxp[p −p2/(2K)] =
K/2.M o r e o v e r ,f o rl o wLc the risk of opportunistic disclosure in the closed mode is high,
so DUi has to give RU a very high revenue share; hence his probability of successful
development is lowered. As the leakage in either mode rises, open sales become less eﬃcient,
while closed sales produce a higher surplus to RU and licensee DUi.
The closed mode is also more eﬃcient for high K. The higher K t h em o r ev a l u a b l e
the monopoly DU’s rent, hence the threat of opportunistic disclosure in the closed mode
is less important. On the other hand, if K is low K<b K(Lc), then a private sale to one
DU is infeasible (s∗(K;Lc) does not exist), so the open mode is chosen. These observations
can be generalised, to the following “single-crossing” property of the impact of K on the
combined surpluses of RU and DU in each mode.
Proposition 1 If the closed mode of knowledge sale is more eﬃcient for RU-DUi coalition
for some e K, then it is also more eﬃcient for all K ≥ e K. There exists a K∗(Lo,L c) ≥ b K(Lc)
such that: Tc ≥ To for all K ≥ K∗(Lo,L c), while if K<K ∗(Lo,L c) the closed mode either
does not exist, or is dominated by the open mode Tc <T o.
17For diﬀerent combinations of leakage coeﬃcients Lo,L c, the comparison of Tc(K;Lo)
and To(K;Lc) satisﬁes one of three cases (Figure 4). First, there is a case where the closed
mode is more eﬃcient whenever s∗(K) exists: Tc ≥ To for all K ≥ b K(Lc). In the second
case the structure is diﬀerent: at K being b K(Lc) or somewhat higher, the open mode
dominates. As K increases above b K(Lc), Tc grows faster than To, and eventually overtakes
it at some point K∗(Lo,L c) ∈ ( b K(Lc),1). As K increases further, the closed mode remains
more eﬃcient; Tc >T o up until K =1 . The third case is that of perfect IPR protection
Lo =0 .I nt h i sc a s e ,t h eo p e nm o d ei sa l w a y so p t i m a l :To = K/2 >T c for all K<1.
The parties’ payoﬀs depend both on the joint surplus and on their outside options.
The RU has an outside option of choosing the open mode of knowledge sale with payoﬀs
{Fo,T o − Fo} to RU and DUi, respectively. Once the IPR is registered, in the form of a
patent, the two parties cannot return to private sales. The DUi’s outside option is more
complex. If Lc ≥ Lo, once the closed mode bargaining begins, DUi can ensure a payoﬀ
of To(K;Lc) − Fo(K;Lc). If DUi is made an oﬀer with a lower payoﬀ,t h e nD U i would
reject RU’s closed mode oﬀer; as DUi has already obtained leaked knowledge LcK, RU’s
best continuation strategy is to patent the knowledge and to license it to DUi.I no r d e rt o
simplify the solution of the game, we consider the case where Lo = Lc = L a n dr e t u r nt o
a more general setup at the end of the section.
In the case Lo = Lc = L, DU’s outside option becomes To(K;L) − Fo(K;L) and the
following result holds.
Proposition 2 Suppose that Lc = Lo. The outcome of the bargaining game is as follows.
T h eR Ua n dh e rl i c e n s e eD U i choose the mode of disclosure that maximizes their joint
surplus. If To >T c then the RU and DUi’s payoﬀsa r e{Fo,T o − Fo}. If To ≤ Tc, then







2 ≥ Fo and Tc
2 ≥ To − Fo
{Fo,T c − Fo} if Tc
2 <F o
{Tc − To + Fo,T o − Fo} if Tc
2 <T o − Fo
The formulas above are very intuitive. Eﬃcient bargaining implies maximization of the
joint surplus which is split in equal proportions as long as the outside options do not bind.8
Figure 5 presents K∗ and b K as functions of L. N o t i c et h a tb o t h b K(L) and K∗(L)




, closed mode sales exist but
are dominated by the open mode. The ﬁgure shows that these domains are small relative
to the regions where the closed mode dominates the open mode (K>K ∗(L))o rw h e r e
the closed mode is not incentive-feasible (K<b K(L)).9 This emphasizes the importance of



















Figure 5: The optimal mode of licensing as a function of K and Lo = Lc = L. The (K,L)
space is partitioned by two curves b K(L) (lower line) and K∗(L) (upper line). For a given L,
b K is the minimum level of knowledge for which the closed mode exists, K∗ is the minimum
level at which the closed mode dominates the open mode. The two curves coincide for all
L ∈ [0.25,0.91].
3.4 Robustness and extensions
Opportunistic disclosure in the closed mode. O u ra n a l y s i si sb a s e do nt h ea s -
sumption that trade secrets — unlike patents — do not protect the licensee from the oppor-
tunistic disclosure by the licensor to competing user of knowledge. This risk is certainly
very important in the knowledge licensing environments and can hardly be mitigated by
contracts where RU’s fees are contingent on discovery by the other DUj (like in Anton and
Yao, 1994). Such contracts are unlikely to be enforceable under standard tort law as (i) it
is hard to specify the invention; (ii) DUj could in principle discover the idea independently
of RU.
19Even if these contracts were feasible, they would have only a limited impact on our
results. Indeed, suppose that instead of the stake s in DUi revenues, RU has to pay a
penalty ϕ (e.g. to a third party) in case DUj invents.10 RU’s wealth constraint implies
ϕ ≤ Fc, where Fc is the lump-sum fee paid by DUi to RU. The strongest incentives are
provided when ϕ = Fc hence the left hand side of the incentive compatibility constraint (6)
becomes FcPd.T h i si m p l i e sFc ≥ (1 − Lc)(1− K)/2. Such contracts are not individually
rational for DUi whenever K<(1 − Lc)/(2 − Lc) (for these K the DU’s payoﬀ Tc − Fc
is negative). Also, for K<(1 − Lc)/(13/8 − Lc),D U i strictly prefers the contract with
positive s.
Diﬀerential leakages in open and closed mode. As discussed above, we believe
that it is reasonable to assume similar leakages across the modes for interim non-marketable
innovations: Lc = Lo. The results however hold if Lc is slightly higher than Lo. Indeed, in
this case the proofs of Proposition 1 and Lemma 3 can be easily reproduced.
The less likely cases are the ones where Lc is lower or substantially higher than Lo.I n
t h el a t t e rc a s et h e r em a ye m e r g eas i t u a t i o nw h e r et h eR U ’ sm a x i m u mp a y o ﬀ in the closed
mode Tc(K;Lc)−[To(K;Lc) − Fo(K;Lc)] is below her open mode fee Fo(K;Lo). Expecting
al o wp a y o ﬀ in the closed mode, RU will prefer the open mode even if the joint surplus
were higher in the closed mode. However, this change does not aﬀect the “monotonicity”
of the mode choice: the closed mode is still selected only for high Ks.11
While the case Lo >L c is less realistic, it is also covered by our analysis.Here the DU’s
outside option in the closed mode is less attractive and therefore RU expects to receive
ah i g h e rp a y o ﬀ in the closed mode. Thus RU may want to stick to the closed mode as
t h eo p e nm o d ew o u l do n l yp r o v i d eh e rw i t hal o wf e eFo(K;Lo). However, if the total
surplus is higher in the open mode, DUi will pay RU for patenting (as the knowledge is
not contractable, the payment should be contingent on the fact of patenting per se).12
C o m p e t i t i o ni nt h eﬁnal product market. We have assumed Bertrand compe-
tition between DUs in the market for the ﬁnal product. This is an extreme assumption
but our results hold in other duopoly settings as long as the monopoly inventor receives a
higher rent than a duopolist. In cases other than Bertrand where the duopolists obtained
non-trivial rents ex post, the value of exclusive license would be lower; it would be harder to
provide incentives for the RU in the closed mode. The closed mode would be less eﬃcient
and would be less likely to be chosen.
RU’s ﬁnancial constraint. The solution above neglects the RU’s ex interim ﬁnancial
constraint. We assume that RU’s payoﬀ consists of a stake in DUi’s revenues worth sPc,
20and a lumpsum transfer Fc. If RU is ﬁnancially constrained, then one needs to take into
account the fact that this transfer cannot be negative, Fc ≥ 0. The results would not change
much. Straightforward calculations yield Fc =( 1−3s)(1−s)K/4. Therefore, the ﬁnancial
constraint is not binding whenever s∗(K,Lc) ≤ 1/3. If s∗(K,Lc) > 1/3, then there is no
way to arrange a closed sale without violating RU’s ﬁnancial constraint: s∗(K,Lc) is the
lowest royalty stake that still prevents opportunistic disclosure. If RU and DUi agree on
an even higher stake s>s ∗(K,Lc), then the lumpsum payment Tc/2−sPc would decrease
further. Indeed, Tc/2 decreases in s,w h i l esPc = sK(1 − s) increases in s for all s ≤ 1/2.
Yet, even if s∗(K,Lc) > 1/3, the closed mode may still be chosen: if Tc >T o and Tc − sPc
is above To − Fo, the DU will agree to a closed mode license with Fc =0 .
4 IPR protection and aggregate development eﬀort
In this Section we study how the endogenous choice of the licensing mode aﬀects the
relationship between IPR protection and the aggregate development expenditure in the
economy. Our model accounts for a number of countervailing eﬀects, some of which have
not been discussed before in the literature. In addition to the well-studied trade-oﬀ between
incentives for the licensee and dissemination of information in the open mode, we also model
the eﬀect of leakage on the development expenditure in the closed mode, and on the choice
of the mode.
Our analysis of the mode choice above (Proposition 1) has straightforward implications
for the comparative statics of the relative strength of these eﬀects. Suppose that the
economy is populated by RUs with high knowledge levels K ( a sw e l la so fh i g hLo and Lc);
in this case the relationship is driven by the eﬀects in the closed mode. If the majority of
RUs have less valuable ideas and the leakage is low, the open mode eﬀects will be more
important. In the intermediate cases, the relationship will be driven by the mode switching
eﬀect.
We show that in some cases it is the latter eﬀect that generates the inverted-U-shaped
relationship between protection of intellectual property and aggregate development expen-
diture. In order to illustrate the importance of the mode switching eﬀect we will ﬁrst
analyse the impact of leakage Lo and Lc on the social welfare.
4.1 Welfare analysis
In this section we compare a measure of social welfare in the two modes for given parameters
K, Lc, and Lo. We calculate expected social welfare as the probability of (not necessarily
sole) ﬁnal invention net of development costs.
21Proposition 3 For all K, Lc,L o social welfare is always higher in the open mode rather
than in the closed mode. The social welfare in the open mode

















monotonically increases with both K and Lo. The social welfare in the closed mode Pc −
P2
c /(2K)=Tc monotonically increases with both K and Lc.
Proposition 3 emphasizes the importance of knowledge spillover for social welfare. First,
the higher the leakage, the higher is our welfare measure in either mode. Second, the
closed mode is always dominated by the open mode in terms of social welfare even if it
is less eﬃcient from the point of view of the RU-DUi coalition. This coalition does not
internalize the payoﬀs to the competing DUj, nor to the consumers who beneﬁtf r o ma
higher probability of invention due to the development contest between the two DUs.
Proposition 3 has straightforward normative implications. If the patent law is designed
to maximize welfare, the regulators choose the highest possible Lo.A s w e a r g u e d a b o v e ,
it is hard to raise Lo above the technologically driven leakage in the closed mode Lc; this
simple result provides yet another argument in favor of the case with Lo = Lc.
Although Proposition 3 implies positive eﬀect of leakage Lo,c on welfare for a given
mode, the relationship between leakage and welfare is not monotonic. Indeed, an increase
in either Lo or Lc implies a more likely switch from the open mode to the closed mode;
as, for a given K, the welfare is higher in the open mode (Proposition 3), this brings
about a lower welfare. Therefore the mode switching eﬀect can generate an inverted-U-
shaped relationship between IPR protection and welfare, even though for a given mode the
relationship is monotonic.
4.2 Leakage, IPR protection, and R&D incentives
One has to be cautious in interpreting the welfare results. Unlike development expenditures,
full social returns to R&D are hard to characterize and measure in reality; there are many
more spillovers and externalities besides those described in our model. This is why empirical
studies focus on the relationship between IPR protection and R&D rather than social
welfare (Lerner, 2001).
For simplicity, we proxy the level of IPR protection by 1 − Lo and the aggregate level
of development expenditure by E1 + E2. We ﬁrst consider the role of IPR protection for
a given mode of disclosure. If the knowledge is disclosed through open sales then better
IPR protection improves the incentives to develop for the licensee DUi, but also weakens
non-licensee DUj’s incentives. Given K and Lo, the total development eﬀort by DU1 and
DU2 i nt h eo p e nm o d ei s











(1 − LoK)2 + Lo(1 − K)2
(1 − LoK2)
2 .
Proposition 4 In the open (patent-based) mode of knowledge sales the total development
eﬀort Eo either monotonically increases with Lo (for K ≤ 1/3) or has a U shape (if
K>1/3). In the latter case, the minimum point of the U-shape L∗
o =( 3 K−1)K−2(3−K)−1
is an increasing function of K.
This result is explained by the relative strength of the countervailing eﬀects of IPR
protection on licensee and non-licensee eﬀorts. If IPR protection is strong (Lo =0 )t h e n
a small decrease in it has a greater impact on DUj than on DUi so the eﬀect is more
important. The positive eﬀect on the licensee DUi is relatively more important if K is high
(and therefore the diﬀerence between K and LoK is high). When K is low (K<1/3),
leakage spurs subsequent development eﬀorts; thisrange of parameters corresponds to the
case of early stages of new technologies such as drugs development based on new ﬁndings
and techniques in biotechnology research.
In the closed mode, DUj does not develop in equilibrium. The threat of opportunistic
disclosure makes DUi give RU a higher share in post-invention revenues which distorts
DUi’s development eﬀort. The higher the leakage Lc, the less important this threat, hence
RU’s incentive constraint is satisﬁed through a lower revenue share s. As a result, Pc and
development eﬀort decrease as intellectual property retention (1 − Lc) increases for all K
for which s∗(K;Lc) exists.
Finally, consider the endogenous choice of the mode of disclosure. If either Lo or Lc is
suﬃciently high, parties switch from open to closed mode which at the margin results in
lower aggregate development expenditure.13
Therefore, there are four eﬀects of stronger IPR protection in the open mode and of
stronger intellectual property retention in the closed mode on the total eﬀort by DUs: (A)
eﬀect on the licensee’s eﬀort in the open mode (negative eﬀect of Lo); (B) eﬀect on the
non-licensee’s eﬀort in the open mode (positive eﬀect of Lo); (C) eﬀect on the DU’s eﬀort
in the closed mode (positive eﬀect of Lc); (D) eﬀect of switching from closed to open mode
(negative eﬀect of either Lo or Lc). The latter two eﬀects are associated with the closed
mode and are therefore relatively more important for higher knowledge levels K,a n df o r
higher levels of knowledge leakage (Lo or Lc).
As shown above in Proposition 4, in the open mode total non-contractible development
expenditures as a function of (1 − Lo) may be monotonic or U-shaped, but may never
have an inverted U-shape. Therefore an “inverted U-shape” relationship between these
cannot be produced by the eﬀects (A) and (B) alone. Once the closed mode is introduced,
23so that the eﬀects (C) and (D) are added, the inverted U-shape may indeed emerge for
a broad range of parameters. Suppose that the following conditions hold: the outcomes
in the open mode mostly result in a negative eﬀect of IPR protection on the development
expenditures; eﬀect (B) prevails over (A). In the closed mode, positive eﬀect (D) dominates
negative eﬀect (C). Both possibilities arise when the prospects for higher levels of K are
not too high. Then as IPR protection declines from perfect, the development expenditures
ﬁrst rise (open mode eﬀect); when IPR protection becomes suﬃciently weak, the mode
switching eﬀect (D) is more important.
4.3 A numerical example
In this section we illustrate the analysis above with a numerical example. In order to capture
the mode switching eﬀect (D), our example has to depart from studying the relationship
at a given K; rather, we consider a continuous distribution of diﬀerent knowledge levels K.
For simplicity’s sake, we take a family of exponential distributions on K ∈ [0,1] :
g(K)=
λe−λK
1 − e−λ (16)
The extreme cases of this family are the uniform distribution for λ =0and a distribution
with a mass point at K =0at λ = ∞. The higher the value of λ, the lower the average
knowledge level EK =
R 1





We will consider two cases. First, we assume Lc = Lo = L (see the discussion in
Section 2.2) and study the eﬀect of variation in L. Here the changes in L correspond to
technologically induced variations in leakage when describing knowledge. In the second
case, we will analyze the situation where much of what is codiﬁed in patents must be
revealed in closed sales to convey the level of K to the buyer (as in Anton and Yao, 1994).
We therefore study the eﬀect of change in Lo alone, holding Lc constant at a high level.
Variations in Lo here reﬂect the strength of patent law and its implementation, which
essentially serve to deﬁne what is considered protected.
4.3.1 Leakage and development expenditures
We ﬁrst consider the case Lo = Lc = L. Figure 6 shows the relationship between L and the
aggregate development expenditures for diﬀerent values of λ, averaged out over K ∈ [0,1]
according to the density function (16). We present the equilibrium level of investment where
the mode of disclosure is chosen as described above, i.e., on the basis of higher ex interim
joint surplus of the RU cum her licensee DUi. In order to understand the incremental






































































Figure 6: The aggregate development expenditures E = E1 + E2 and the welfare 1 − (1 −
P1)(1−P2)−E as a function of leakage L in the case Lo = Lc = L. The bold line shows the
relationship given the equilibrium (i.e. ex interim privately optimal) mode of disclosure.
T h et h i nl i n ei st h ea g g r e g a t ed e v e l o p m e n te x p e n d i t u r ei nt h eo p e nm o d e( a si ft h ec l o s e d
mode were ruled out exogenously). The three scenarios are “High K” (λ =0 , EK =0 .5,
g(1)/g(0) = 1), “Medium K” (λ =3 , EK =0 .28, g(1)/g(0) = 0.05), and “Low K” (λ =7 ,
EK =0 .14, g(1)/g(0) = 0.0009).
summed across DU1 and DU2, in the open mode (as if the closed mode were exogenously
ruled out).
The graphs show that indeed the eﬀects (A) and (B) can only produce either a monotonic
(increasing for low λ, decreasing for high λ) or a U-shaped relationship (for intermediate
values of λ). Once we consider both modes of disclosure and allow for the eﬀects (C) and
(D), the relationship between (1−L) and [E1 + E2] changes qualitatively and does indeed












































































Figure 7: The aggregate development expenditures E = E1 + E2 and the welfare 1 − (1 −
P1)(1 − P2) − E as a function of IPR protection Lo in the case Lc =0 .9. The bold line
shows the relationship given the equilibrium (i.e. ex interim privately optimal) mode of
disclosure. The thin line is the aggregate development expenditure in the open mode (as if
the closed mode were ruled out exogenously). The three scenarios are “High K” (λ =0 ) ,
“Medium K” (λ =3 ), and “Low K” (λ =7 ).
4.3.2 IPR protection and development expenditures
In this subsection we study the eﬀect of change in the enforcement of IPR holding the
leakage from description Lc constant. We reproduce the simulations above for various
Lo ≤ Lc.The results are very similar. Again, for a large range of parameters we ﬁnd
the inverted-U-shaped relationship between IPR protection and development expenditures.
This relationship cannot be explained by the open mode eﬀects alone.
Figure 7 shows that the relationship between IPR protection (1 − Lo) at Lc =0 .9 and
the aggregate development expenditures for diﬀerent values of λ is similar to the one in
Figure 6 above.14 T h er e s u l t sa r er o b u s tt ot h ec h o i c eo fLc. It turns out that the most
important eﬀect behind the inverted U-shape is the mode-switching eﬀect (D): increased
leakage in either open or closed results in a higher likelihood of the closed mode.
264.3.3 Summary
To summarize, the shape of the relationship between (E1+E2) and Lo varies substantially
w i t ht h ee xa n t ed i s t r i b u t i o no fk n o w l e d g eK. While for high λ (λ ≥ 7)t h er e l a t i o n s h i p
has an inverted-U shape, in the case of an uniform distribution (λ =0 ) the relationship is
actually U-shaped. For intermediate values of parameters (λ =3 ) the graph is a superpo-
sition of an U-shape and an inverted-U-shape. Our numerical example is highly stylized,
so it is hard to judge which values of parameters are realistic. Still, we may presume that
the range λ ∈ [3,7] is somewhat consistent with observed characteristics of modern R&D
(see Teece, 2000).
Figures 6 and 7 also illustrate the impact of IPR protection on the social welfare and
show that the mode switching eﬀect can indeed produce the inverted-U-shaped relationship
as discussed above.
5 Concluding remarks
We develop a model of two-stage cumulative research and development (R&D). Research
Unit (RU) produces non-veriﬁa b l ek n o w l e d g et h a th a sn om a r k e tv a l u ep e rs eb u ti tc a nb e
used by Development Units (DUs) to create a marketable product. Due to the non-rivalrous
nature of knowledge, there is a risk that after disclosing to one DU, RU will further disclose
the information to a competing DU. We consider two alternative mechanisms that create
RU’s commitment to exclusive disclosure: the ‘open sale’ based on patenting the interim
knowledge, and the ‘closed sale’ where precluding further sales requires the RU to obtain
a share in the licensed DU’s post-invention revenues.
An open or patented sale provides legal support for exclusive disclosure, but it also
involves leakage of a certain portion of the knowledge to the public in the process of ﬁling
a patent application. A closed sale helps to reduce such leakage, but the need for giving
away a share of post-invention revenues to RU weakens the licensee DU’s incentives to
invest in development. We explicitly model the extensive form bargaining in both modes of
disclosure, and ﬁnd that the parties are more likely to choose the closed mode if the interim
knowledge is very valuable and intellectual property rights are not very well protected. Our
theory also generates potentially testable predictions in the structure of knowledge licensing
fees in closed sales: the more valuable the knowledge, the lower the royalty stake.
Our model shows that there is no uniform ranking of the two knowledge disclosure
modes in terms of overall R&D investment induced. We ﬁnd that both the comparisons
of magnitude of research and development expenditures across the modes of knowledge
disclosure, and the relationship between overall knowledge-development eﬀorts and the
27strength of intellectual property rights protection, depend qualitatively on the ex ante
distribution of interim knowledge levels.
Our results on the impact of Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) protection in patents
on a measure of social welfare are also of considerable interest. First, we show that despite
the adverse impact of low IPR protection on the development incentives of the licensee,
our measure of social welfare is always decreasing in the strength of IPR. This is the case
despite the dissipation of developers’ rents in the event of multiple inventions by licensee and
non-licensee developers; our result is therefore diﬀerent from that obtained by Bessen and
Maskin (2000). Nevertheless, the existence of a trade-secret-based closed mode in our model
implies that the optimal degree of IPR protection is not zero, nor even that (attainable)
of the level of leakage occuring in such closed-mode negotiations prior to licensing. The
reason is that weaker IPR protection in patents would lead to research units resorting to
such closed-mode licensing for a greater range of knowledge levels, which in turn always
harms our social welfare measure, even when the overall level of development eﬀort (by one
as opposed to two DUs) might be increased thereby. Hence, as we show, the extent of IPR
protection that is optimal for social welfare may well be interior arising from endogenous
choices over these two modes of knowledge licensing.15
Throughout our paper, we have deemphasized the incentives of ﬁrst-stage Research
Units to generate knowledge, and the impact of increased IPR protection thereon. In part
that is because the qualitative impact of (potential) leakage on RU’s payoﬀsc a nd i ﬀer
substantially depending on her chosen mode of knowledge sale. RU’s payoﬀ is decreas-
ing in the leakage parameter in open sales, but possibly increasing in leakage in closed
sales. Furthermore, even if increased IPR protection augments RU’s interim payoﬀs, and
enhances her incentives for creation of higher levels of interim knowledge, it is far from
clear that such an eﬀect would generate an inverted U-shaped relationship between overall
R&D expenditures and the strength of IPR protection. As we have shown above, such a
relationship may easily result from endogenous private choices over modes of licensing of
diﬀerent levels of interim knowledge.16
28Notes
1. Teece (2000) and Pisano (1986) argue that in order to solve the problem of oppor-
tunistic use of information, the parties should form alliances which provide adequate
incentives through equity participation (similar to the contingent contracts in our
model). Majewski (2004) shows that the risk of misappropriation of knowledge is
substantial and it often results in limits on personnel exchange in cooperative R&D.
Oxley (1999) shows that the risk of opportunistic use of ideas shapes organizational
form of international R&D companies (consistent with our model’s predictions, the
higher the risk the more equity participation). A simple solution to this problem is
described in a recent motion picture titled “The Paycheck,” based on a science-ﬁction
story by Phillip K. Dick. A corporate researcher is rewarded via cash and shares in
the ﬁrm that buys his inventions; however, he also has his memory erased after each
discovery to ensure its non-disclosure to competitors, a technology that we rule out.
2. The researcher’s share may be quite substantial. Recently, a Japanese court enhanced
the reward of an inventor, holding a patent jointly with his ex-employer, from 20,000
to 20 billion yen (189 million dollars); see New York Times (2004). Stakes are even
higher in biotech-pharmaceutical licensing: the Hoﬀmann-La Roche’s recent deal with
Antisoma included a lump-sum payment of $43 million plus 10-20 per cent of royalties
on any products Roche brings to market. In theory, payments to Antisoma could
exceed $500 million if all existing products were successfully launched (Featherstone
and Renfrey, 2004). The choice of contracts on revenue rather than on net proﬁtm a y
be driven by concerns such as in Anand and Galetovic (2000), of the possibility of
the buyer inﬂating his reported expenditures to hold up the seller of the knowledge.
3. After writing the ﬁrst draft of this paper, we have also become aware of Lai et al.
(2003), who deal with similar issues, albeit in a diﬀerent framework. In particular,
they exogenously parameterize the eﬀect of opportunistic disclosure on RU’s and DUs’
ex post revenues, while we explicitly model a development race. Another related paper
is Baccara and Razin (2002) where the original innovator has to share information
with his collaborators who could potentially leak his knowledge to a diﬀerent partner.
The innovator appropriates a substantial part of the surplus, because he can threaten
the collaborators with the loss of ex post monopoly rents via further disclosures.
While our closed mode of knowledge sales is based on a similar idea, unlike Baccara
and Razin we model our RU’s stake in her licensee DU’s ex post revenue as being
contractible.
4. An early theoretical argument for such a relationship between IPR protection in the
29form of patent length and the expected value of resulting inventions was provided by
Horwitz and Lai (1996). Sakakibara and Brensetter (2001) have analyzed Japanese
evidence on this issue, based on the impact of patent reforms.
5. Earlier, Scotchmer and Green (1990) developed a two-stage model of cumulative
R&D, in which patenting (disclosure) of an interim innovation causes full leakage
of its implications for second-stage inventions to other RU cum DUs. They ana-
lyzed endogenous choices of the timing of patenting under alternative IPR protection
regimes.
6. In some cases, patenting may involve a greater extent of knowledge leakage than pri-
vate sales. For example, the choice of Process rather than Product licensing in Indian
patent law for pharmaceutical innovations, prior to her joining the WTO, probably
facilitated the development of alternative processes for the same ﬁnal product, by
requiring patent applicants to disclose more fully the original processes for manufac-
turing their products. In contrast, closed licenses for manufacturing these products
are likely to have resulted in similar levels of disclosure about innovators’ processes
only after agreement on royalties.
7. As well as other results, the fact that sPc decreases in K i sn o ta na r t e f a c to fa
speciﬁc functional form. Indeed, the incentive compatibility constraint requires that
s = s∗(K,L) satisﬁes sPcPd = Ud(Pd) − Ud(Qd),w h e r eUd denotes the DUj ’s payoﬀ
gross of any payments to RU. In other words, sPc =[ Ud(Pd) − Ud(Qd)]/Pd,s ot h a t
sPc declines with K whenever the RHS does, which is likely as long as Ud(Pd) is
weakly concave in K,a n dl e a k a g ei sw e a k l yc o n v e xi nK.
8 .I ft h eo p e nm o d ei ss u b o p t i m a l( To <T c), then the outside option can bind for at
most one party. The precise division of the surplus Tc in such a sale is unimportant
for our qualitative results, however. For an analysis of buyer-seller bargaining under
asymmetric information about the knowledge level K, s e ed ’ A s p r e m o n te ta l .( 2 0 0 0 ) .
9. The details of the calculations that determine the properties of the two curves in
Figure 5 are available upon request.
10. In an unpublished appendix, we explore these issues in full detail studying arbitrary
contracts contingent on 2x2=4 outcomes of discovery by each DU. It turns out that
the results are very similar. Although more general contracts do reduce ineﬃciency
due to the binding IC constraint, the equilibrium arrangements still involve a positive
royalty stake s>0 and have the same comparative statics properties.
3011. We have not been able to produce a simple analytical proof but the numerical cal-
culations do show that it is the case for all Lc,L o,K.W e h a v ea l s o f o u n d t h a tt h e
situation where RU prefers open mode even if the joint surplus is higher in the closed
mode does require Lo to be substantially below Lc and K being very close to b K(Lc).
E.g. if Lc =0 .9, it only occurs for Lo ≤ 0.78; if Lc =0 .5, it requires Lo ≤ 0.28.
12. The full-blown analysis of this case shou l da l s ot a k ei n t oa c c o u n tap o t e n t i a lf o ra
war of attrition between the two DUs. As both DUs beneﬁt from switching to the
open mode, each can wait for the other one to pay the RU for patenting.
13. Indeed, consider the case of Lo = Lc = L, and L<0.25 or L>0.91. In this case,
the switching occurs at the point where Tc = To. At this point, the total cost of
development is greater in the open mode: by deﬁnition, Tc = sPc +( 1− s)Pc −
P2
c /(2K)=Pc(1+s)/2=To = Po(1− e Po)/2. Since the total eﬀort in the closed mode
(1 − s)Pc/2 is below Pc(1 + s)/2, it is also below Po(1 − e Po)/2+( 1− Po)e Po/2 which
is the total eﬀort in the open mode. In the case L ∈ [0.25,0.91], switching occurs
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its maximum possible value – into expressions for total eﬀo r ti no p e na n dc l o s e d
mode we ﬁnd that switching to the closed mode reduces total eﬀort, at the level of
knowledge K = b K(L). We need to determine the sign of Eo−Ec at K = b K(L), where
Ec = P2
c /(2K)=K(1−s)2/2 is the development eﬀort in the closed mode. The sign is
positive whenever
h
(1 − L b K(L))2 + L(1 − b K(L))2
i
/(1−L b K2(L))2 > (1−(1+L)/4)2.
The latter inequality holds. The right-hand side is below 9/16 for all L ∈ [0,1], while
the minimum value of the left-hand side is 0.83. Indeed, the left-hand side decreases
in L for all L<0.52 and then increases in L; at L =0 .52 the LHS equals 0.83.
14. The kinks in the Figure 7 are due to the eﬀect described in section 3.4 which emerges
when Lo is substantially below Lc.
15. It might be argued that the overall optimal policy would be to set Lo = Lc,a s
it might be diﬃcult to demand greater disclosure than this from patentees, and to
ban closed-mode licensing, which is feasible in our model since such licensing entails
veriﬁable revenue sharing across research and development units. However, regulatory
prohibitions of such revenue-sharing contracts would harm social welfare in situations
where revenue sharing serves to incentivise simultaneous R&D eﬀorts by units in jont
ventures, e.g., as in Fulghieri and Sevilir (2004).
16. Another interesting avenue of research is to study the implications of our analysis
31for the choice of the ﬁrst-stage research projects. Under diﬀerent circumstances, RU
may prefer projects with more/less valuable but also more/less portable knowledge
(that is endogenously high/low K and L)i n v o l v i n gd i ﬀerent quantity and quality of
employees and diﬀerent structure of research units.
32Appendix: Proofs
P r o o fo fL e m m a1 .
Proof. The unique subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) in the bargaining game is as follows.
RU always oﬀers the fee above to DUi.D U i accepts the oﬀer, because he knows that DUj
will agree to the payoﬀ Uo a f t e rp a y i n gt h i sf e ew h e ns h ei so ﬀered the license next. Similar
reasoning holds for DUj.
Indeed, let us reproduce the proof in Bolton-Whinston (1993). Conventional arguments
imply that in SPE, the RU’s licensing oﬀer is accepted by DUi in the ﬁrst round. The
uniqueness follows from the fact that RU chooses the continuation subgame that provides
her with the highest payoﬀ. In order to calculate the licensing fee, let us denote {ui,u j} the
DUs’ payoﬀs in the SPE; here i is the DU whose turn is to be made the oﬀer, and j is the
other one. Then the maximum possible fee DUi would pay is Fo = To−δuj;i fTo−Fo < δuj,
the DUi would turn down the oﬀer. Therefore RU’s equilibrium strategy is to oﬀer Fo. As
DUi accepts RU’s oﬀer in equilibrium, the non-licensee DU gets uj = Uoj (Qo,P o;LoK).
As δ → 1, we obtain the fee above.
Proof of Lemma 2.
Proof. The proof is straightforward. Let us ﬁrst consider the case Lc < 1. For K =0 , the
incentive constraint (11) does not hold. If K>0, the inequality turns into
2s
2 − (1 + Lc)s +( 1− Lc)(1/K − 1)] ≤ 0.
Since the parties are interested in ﬁnding the lowest s that still satisﬁes (6), we need to
s o l v ef o rt h es m a l l e rr o o t .T h er e a lr o o te x i s t si fa n do n l yi fK ≥ b K(Lc) where b K(Lc) is
given by (13). In this case, the smaller root is (12).
If the leakage is complete Lc =1(as in Anton and Yao, 1994), the incentive constraint
is always satisﬁed. Indeed, second sale would never be tempting for the RU, as she would
not get any revenue from DUj. In this case formulas (12) and (13) still hold: b K(1) = 0,
and s∗(K;1)=0.
The second sale never happens in equilibrium. Indeed, suppose that the contract {s,Fc}
is such that RU decides to sell knowledge to DU2 as well; it is easy to show that in this case
the optimal royalty is trivial s =0 . Essentially, parties go back to the open mode where
RU sells to both DUs. As discussed above, this outcome is dominated by the exclusive
patented sale.
Proof of Proposition 1.
Proof. The joint surpluses in the closed and the open modes are equal to each other at
K =1:Tc(1;Lc)=To(1;Lo)=1 /2. For any given L>0 the functions Tc(K) and To(K)
33may cross at most once more, at K = K∗(Lo,L c) < 1. At this crossing point, Tc(K) grows
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> 0.
To prove this single crossing result, we consider the ratios of joint surplus T and the




in each mode (Figure 4). In the closed
mode, the surplus would be K/2 if the opportunistic disclosure were exogenously ruled out.
Straightforward calculations imply that s∗(K,Lc) is a decreasing convex function of K (see
(12)). Therefore the ratio Tc/(K/2) = 1 − s∗(K,Lc)2 is an increasing concave function of
K.
In the open mode, K/2 is the surplus in the absence of leakage. Hence the ratio
To/(K/2) reﬂects the expropriation of the joint surplus by the non-licensee development.
As discussed above, the non-licensee DUj’s eﬀort ﬁrst increases in K,a n dt h e nf a l l s .N o t
surprisingly, To/(K/2) is convex (and strictly convex for all Lo > 0). Indeed, To
K/2 is convex
if 1−LoK








2Lo [1 − L2
oK3 +3 LoK2 − 3LoK]
(1 − LoK2)
3
is non-negative: the terms in brackets can be rearranged as Lo (1 − K)
3+(1 − Lo)(1+LoK3).
Since Tc/(K/2) is concave and To/(K/2) is convex, and both are equal to 1 at K =1 ,
there can be three cases: (i) Tc/(K/2) <T o/(K/2) for all b K(Lc) ≤ K<1; (ii) Tc/(K/2) >




such that Tc/(K/2) <




and Tc/(K/2) >T o/(K/2) for all K ∈ (K∗,1). The
cases (ii) and (iii) are the two versions of the single crossing described in the Proposition.
In order to rule out case (i), let us consider K suﬃciently close to 1. If K → 1, then (5)
and (14) imply Tc → [1






]; To → [1
2K −(1 −K) Lo
1−Lo]. Therefore for
any Lo > 0, there exists a range of K suﬃciently close to 1 such that Tc >T o.
Proof of Proposition 3.
Proof. Using (4) we ﬁnd that the social welfare in the open mode












































2 and is therefore non-negative.
According to (14), the welfare in the closed mode Tc increases in K and Lc and is always
below K/2.
Proof of Proposition 4.
Proof. One can easily show that dEo/dL > 0 whenever Lo > Λ(K) ≡ (3K − 1)K−2(3 −
K)−1. The right hand side Λ(K) increases with K for all K ∈ [0,1] with Λ(1/3) = 0 and
Λ(1) = 1. Hence for all K ≤ 1/3, eﬀort Eo is decreasing in Lo, while for K ∈ (1/3,1) eﬀort
is U-shaped with the minimum point at Lo = Λ(K).
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